Our tour group has rented an outboard
for a day of Pacific sightseeing. We putter along the coast,
contented. We clear a promontory, and two islands come into
view. The islands are much alike: each a shining ring of sand
surmounted by palm thicket. A mile of ocean ripples between them.
We dock on
the westward island to take our lunch in palmshaded view of its
counterpart. A resident greets us and we share lunch with him as he
educates us in the fauna of local seas. Then he surprises us. He
declares that these two islands are "invisibly connected."
They are not two islands at all, he says, but only one.
We wonder if
he isn't having a bit of fun with us. After all, the islands are
marked on our tourist map as separate geographical entities: no bridge or reef links them. His statement seems incredible. We protest,
but he stands by his claim. "Spend the night here," he says.
"You'll see for yourselves."
It's a
friendly invitation. We take him up on it. Beers and cards are
produced, and we practice card tricks in his living room as day rolls into
night.
The moon
ascends, and our host packs up the cards. "Now, to the
invisible connection."
We
follow him to the beach, pausing together when the sand softens
underfoot. We search the night horizon for the second island, and for the
alleged "connection."
When our eyes
come to terms with the moonlight, we locate the second island. We
see no great change in its appearance. And then we see that our host has pulled
off a clever card trick. For while we mastered Vegas shuffling
techniques, a spring tide ebb stole in — draining the intervening waters
entirely. At this moment the two islands are no longer separated by a
mile of shallow ocean. Dry land connects them as one.
The narrative metaphor expresses something
of that pre-verbal intuition which has sparked the phrase "existential
passage." What is pre-verbal cannot of course be expressed adequately in words, especially here, at the limit of subjective being. Subject-verb syntax cannot express the subject in transition. We can however give some meaningful interpretation to the metaphor.
We can interpret the
two islands as representing two personal identities, such as those of Nicos and
Thanos. Those identities are distinct throughout the duration of their
lives. We have reason to mark them down on the "map of life"
as separate islands of being.
But islands are
entirely dependent upon the ocean for their existence. When a deep spring
tide ebb drains the ocean between them, the islands which were formerly separate
merge into one. They remain as one until the ocean returns to divide
them. This all occurs effortlessly, by default.
Nicos is likewise
dependent on the criteria of personal identity for his (seemingly) independent
being. When the criteria fail him at death, he loses his independence; and
by default he merges
across an unfelt time-gap into whichever personal identity
next assembles into being.
[13]
Now, a note concerning
repetition:
Some verbal
constructions have been of necessity repeated within this chapter.
Repetition can trick us into admitting words with a too-easy familiarity, even if the concepts which those words
represent remain mysterious in their details. And I shouldn't want to lull the reader into
any such false habituation. If I cannot eradicate the offending pattern
altogether, I can correct the deficiency almost as well by alerting the reader
to it.
Here is an
example: In several passages I have reiterated that Thanos
"receives" Nicos' "personal identity" through
"existential passage." We should resist the pull of that
repetition by bracing to the fact that the words in quotation marks are not incantations. They cannot drive the passage event by wordplay. That would be tantamount to
"forcing the lock."
The definitions,
phrasings and logical inferences of this essay are nothing more than glosses
on nature's corpus. Nature must drive the
passage event, and nature — pervasive, generative, mysterious nature — is capable. Reliable, too; even the very standard of reliability. Where nature assembles necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon, we trust nature to deliver the phenomenon.
That trust applies to essay conditions, as everywhere. Existential passage is
plausible only if it is understood to transpire by means as natural and
reliable as the ebb and flow of tide.
My interpretation of the tidal
metaphor drops a phrase to plumb my
thoughts on existential passage. I've spoken of the tide as acting
"effortlessly, by default." The phrase, "
by default," has seemed to me apt enough to
deserve permanent attachment to this philosophy. This is why
"Metaphysics by Default" is now the chosen name.
"By
default" — what pigments of meaning can that phrase brush across the
metaphysics?
One meaning draws
from the popular vernacular. When we make a "default assumption"
about some subject we are assuming what is most common or most likely true
about that subject. This is how we treat subjects which are uncontroversial:
subjects which are established and trustworthy in our minds.
The academic
knowledge which I have cited in chapters past is mere textbook
material. It has been peer-reviewed and discussed in earnest
in some cases over a span of hundreds of years. By this method
corporeal existence, delimited by complete mortality and personal identity,
has risen to the level of a default assumption in our
time. A metaphysics which relies upon corporeal existence can lay honest claim to the title
"Metaphysics by Default." The wind is at its back.
In contrast, a
metaphysics which would attempt to contravene
corporeal existence would find itself today
bucking a strong headwind. The defense of such a metaphysics would have to
address a number of issues, including those raised in this essay. A few
hypothetical examples can push some issues to the forefront:
For
example: An immortality metaphysics might posit that our memory of
life can survive the grave. Now, to support that position
the argument would need to demonstrate some means whereby our memories could be
recalled sans neocortex and hippocampus. Otherwise
the argument would be seen to ignore evidence which speaks against
it.
Or perhaps an
immortality metaphysics might posit that the corporeal body
cannot produce some vital psychological state. To support that position
the argument would need to define this psychological state clearly, then make clear
the impossibility of any corporeal production, and then
propose some incorporeal means of attainment. (This was Proclus' approach.)
Or possibly an
immortality metaphysics might deny the putative individuality of each personal
identity, blurring living individuals into an undifferentiated One. To support
such a trans-personal identity hypothesis, the argument would need to provide evidence of a functional linkage
between living minds; or else expose some crippling deficiency in the individualistic
criteria of personal identity.
Well, these would all be herculean
labors. We can see just how it is that immortality raises so many
intractable problems for the modern philosopher.
[14]
Metaphysics by Default circumvents these problems. This new transmigration philosophy ventures no immortality conjecture. Instead it uses two natural keys — found in mortality and personal identity — to open a metaphysical lock; deducing a type of transmigration that is not encumbered by the many hard problems of immortality.
Within the philosophy's modern
and widely-accepted conceptual framework existential passage occurs naturally, even "by
default."
One other application of the word
"default" suggests itself. Quoting Cicero:
Nature is the one who has granted us the
loan of our lives, without setting any schedule for repayment. What
has one to complain of if she calls in the loan when she will?
[15]