Application to Other Species
continued, Section 4 of 4
The Subjectivity Criterion, by Entity Class:
Restating the working definition:
"Subjectivity" will stand for the "subjective locus," or
"the ability to distinguish self from not-self." If the
definition is to be substantial, it should exclude purely reflexive
physiologies and behaviors. Reflexes do not separate, or abstract, conscious
experience from primitive sensation. Bare reflexes are almost certainly inadequate for
Inanimates: Inanimates in nature lack even reflexive behavior,
and exhibit no subjective awareness of other inanimates. All natural inanimates
fail the subjectivity criterion.
: Cells display a chemical recognition of
neighboring cells, through the reaction of surface biochemistries. But the behavioral
range of eukaryotes and prokaryotes would seem to be bounded by the formulae
of biochemistry. Eukaryotes and prokaryotes lack structures for transmitting representations (or perceptions) of their
external and internal environments — a prerequisite of subjective awareness.
Even mobile bacteria, whose motions are certainly directed, are thought for this reason to be unaware of
single-celled organisms fail the subjectivity criterion.
plants: What is true of single-celled plants is true of multi-celled
plants. All plants fail the subjectivity criterion.
: No computer has yet demonstrated overt subjective
awareness. Even global networks of computers behave as a single,
undifferentiated entity unless explicitly programmed not to. Generally
speaking, computer networks offer a poor "insect-like" imitation of
social behavior. Indeed, some social insects (considered hereafter)
exhibit a greater range
of behaviors than can be found in the most sophisticated of computerized robots.
On the other hand,
the neural net models of attention and awareness mentioned in Chapter 8 might seem to
contradict these critical statements. Those models mimic the physiology of
human brain systems; systems whose abilities far exceed those of insect neural
groups, as demonstrated by their contributions to human subjectivity. So
it might be tempting to assign subjectivity to robotic models
of those systems as well.
But we cannot
afford to lose sight of the fact that a model of a system is just
a model it is not the real system itself. When the
system is simple a model may come close to acquiring all its fine-grained properties. For example, a ballistics model may predict projectile
motion with great precision. It succeeds in this mimicry because a
ballistics system is simple in comparison with, say, a biological
system. But neural systems, being biological, are staggeringly
complex. For this reason neural net models can mimic only the grossest
behaviors of living neural net structures.
The hippocampal CA3 neural net of Chapter 6 is exceptional in that its small size and
uniform structure have
made it a good candidate for modeling and mimicry.
The diverse attentional structures of Chapter 8, however, are among the largest and most complex
neurologies ever modeled. Current models of these structures are therefore piecemeal: useful
as tools of investigation, but useless as mimics. The models do not themselves enact attentional behaviors.
profitably compare this situation with the current state-of-the-art in hurricane
simulation programs. These programs model the gross characteristics of
hurricanes; predicting, for example, a hurricane's track,
rainfall, and cloud coverage. The
simulations are useful to meteorologists, but no one has ever confused a
hurricane simulation with a real hurricane. Certainly, a simulation does
bear a resemblance to the real thing from afar. But up close it is not at
all faithful to the details. There are no "simulated raindrops"
in a hurricane simulation. The mathematics of raindrop formation are not currently incorporated within
the mathematics of hurricane formation.
Nature operates at
all levels and scales concurrently. A real hurricane may be an
ocean-spanning weather system, but at the same time it is also every single
raindrop that falls from its clouds. It follows that only when a
simulation faithfully models all levels and scales of the hurricane from
the wide ocean down to the solitary raindrop
will it then qualify as a "full-blown" storm.
gap between model and reality is vast, even for an inanimate like a
hurricane. The neural intricacy of subjective animates suggests a functional gap of comparable vastness.
Perhaps this gap
will narrow in future, but at present all
computers fail the subjectivity criterion.
: Social insects, such as bees, exhibit what might
appear at first glance to be a rudimentary awareness of others of their own species.
Their social behavior is, however, highly regimented and in large measure
With at most a million neurons,
and with no need for sophisticated social judgments,
these creatures might find subjective awareness of other individuals to be an expensive and
superfluous mental construct. For these reasons it is not surprising that
characterized as "social" are seen upon closer examination to be reflexive and
instinctive. This seems to be the case with many, though not all, complex invertebrate behaviors.
A textbook on
invertebrate nervous systems gives an example of this limitation, in a study
of the apparent plasticity of arthropod locomotion. That plasticity was
once thought to require a kind of sophisticated learning, but is now understood
to be determinate:
plasticity may in fact be its opposite a stereotypy in a complex
and adaptable form.... [P]redetermined, fixed, alternative patterns can be
instantly substituted by alternating components of a complex of interlocked
circuits and loops and hence changing certain input magnitudes, coupling
functions, or time constants....
That text goes on to characterize the
nervous systems of arthropods (the invertebrates with segmented bodies and
jointed legs). Emphasis is on the independent function of neural groups,
and also on the paucity of interneurons (those neurons which are located
entirely within the central nervous system):
The outstanding feature of the arthropod
central nervous system is the economy in number of
interneurons.... Frequently ganglia of the cord can coordinate a
reflex response without the mediation of the brain. In the claw of the
crayfish, touching the inside and the outside of the claw initiates opposite
responses of closing and opening, but the brain apparently receives no
interneuron which conveys directly the information of the position of the
Arthropod neurology might fairly be categorized as a
neurology of loosely-coordinated reflexive structures. As arthropods
lack the integrative superstructure of truly central nervous systems,
they are likely incapable of centralizing any coherent subjective locus, or of
using it to differentiate themselves from others.
Among invertebrates only the large-brained cephalopod (cuttlefish)
species exhibit robust awareness of others. Octopus vulgaris
subjective awareness of other octopuses
under controlled experimental conditions, through the act of "learning by observation." A summary of
the scope of subjectivity and memory shown to be present in the octopus:
[W]orkers trained two groups of
'demonstrator' octopuses to discriminate between red and white spheres...
until they reached criterion (no errors in five consecutive trials).
Each animal was then tested without reward four times in the field of view
of a naive 'observer' octopus in an adjacent tank. None of the
demonstrators made any errors during testing, so what each observer octopus
saw was its demonstrator attack one of a pair of objects four times (at five
minute intervals). When the observers were themselves tested without
any kind of reward, they attacked the 'correct' shape significantly more
than the 'incorrect' one, and their performance was significantly better
after four trials than that of the demonstrators at that stage of their own
training.... [T]he rapidity claimed for 'observational learning' in this
experiment is remarkable, especially as the observers never saw a food
reward being given to the demonstrators for an attack on a sphere.
is yet to be corroborated but... whatever the theoretical basis for this
type of learning,... it does seem remarkable in animals such as
The text cited above, Cephalopod Behaviour, is a recent (1996) survey of this invertebrate class. The
authors express their broad opinion in an epilogue:
It may also be necessary to temper some
of our claims for cephalopods. In may ways their behaviour is no more
remarkable than that of the many fishes, birds and mammals that compete with
them and prey upon them, especially if one accepts the thesis... that
cephalopods are 'honorary vertebrates.' It is only when one considers
them as invertebrates, and especially as molluscs, that their behaviour
seems extraordinary. The cephalopods we know best have life styles
completely unlike those of limpets, sea-slugs, and clams....
Yet if the
behaviour of cephalopods is no more complex than that of fishes or lower
vertebrates, it is certainly no less so. On reviewing the themes
discussed in this book, it becomes clear that cephalopod behaviour has two
striking characteristics: versatility and plasticity. By versatility
we mean the possibility of selecting
from among several possible courses of action.... By plasticity
we mean the ability to change the responses made to a
stimulus after it has proved inappropriate.....
a foraging octopus, or a shoal of Sepioteuthis
[squid] on a coral reef, is a remarkable experience; the way the animals
exhibit what appear to be caution, stealth, intelligence and watchfulness
would surely fascinate any biologist.
On the basis of such evidence we can
conclude that a few cephalopod invertebrates meet the subjectivity
criterion. Of these, Octopus vulgaris is the most certain candidate.
Vertebrates: Vertebrates consistently demonstrate subjective
awareness of others of their species. This awareness has
been confirmed under controlled conditions by mirror-image stimulation (MIS) experiments.
MIS reflects a
mirrored self-image back to the subject, in order to elicit a
A qualifying response is a social behavior which the animal reserves for display
among others of its own species. The most common response is a territorial defense action,
directed against the (presumed) intruding competitor. Also common is an "incentive response,"
in which the animal selects its mirrored image over alternative rewards.
Many vertebrate species have been seen
to respond to a
mirrored image. Some of the lower vertebrate species known to respond
readily include stickleback fish,
Siamese fighting fish, goldfish, pigeons, chaffinches, and hedge
A mirror-image response is premised on an animal's
ability to distinguish others of its species. The animal must interpret visual cues
so as to be aware
of the presence of other
This species-awareness is a cognitive construct, and is
almost certainly a legitimate form
of subjective awareness.
MIS results are supported by field studies of social behaviors among vertebrates in the wild,
and also under domestication.
Such field studies provide indirect evidence of subjective awareness
among lower vertebrates, in that the observed behaviors require those vertebrate creatures to maintain continual awareness of the
presence, and disposition, of others. Some lower vertebrates, such as the stickleback, have even demonstrated preferential recognition
of specific individuals within their social groups.
In Chapter 8
looked at the thalamus' central role in the maintenance of subjectivity and
awareness. The thalamus, like the hippocampus, is not unique to
humans, but is instead common to all vertebrates. This structural commonality
is consistent with vertebrates' common behavioral demonstrations of subjective
awareness, noted above (and also, below). Photographs and illustrations of several
vertebrate species' thalami will help to clarify this commonality.
Figures appropriate to each entity class will be inserted among the
paragraphs to follow.
Beginning with nonmammalian vertebrates: a
diagram of the nonmammalian brain shows the general location and connections of
the nonmammalian thalamus in these lower vertebrates:
representation of thalamus in nonmammalian vertebrates
thalamic organs are shown below, in cross-section:
Frog thalamus: dorsal thalamic nuclei and
rotundus of thalamus
MIS experiments, field studies
and thalamic similarities have been catalogued for only a few of the lower vertebrate species,
but the data
available at present suggests that all vertebrates
satisfy the subjectivity criterion.
: As with vertebrates generally.
Mirror-image awareness is pronounced among mammals. Some have demonstrated very robust
subjective awareness of other members of their species. Mammals have demonstrated
this robust awareness
in experiment through expressions of overtly social
MIS behaviors falling into this category include acts of aggression related to social status,
habituation to the "unfamiliar other," and curiosity (which animals sometimes
demonstrate by looking behind the mirrors).
Sea lions have demonstrated MIS social aggression; and squirrel monkeys, pigtailed monkeys and rhesus monkeys
have demonstrated all of the listed MIS social behaviors in experimental settings.
Field studies have recorded a wide range of mammalian social behaviors in the wild,
and also under domestication.
Such field studies provide indirect evidence of subjective awareness
among mammals, in that the observed behaviors require the mammals to maintain continual awareness of the
presence, and disposition, of others. Additionally, many mammals have demonstrated preferential recognition
of specific individuals within their social groups.
These MIS findings and field studies are amply corroborated by
our experience with familiar mammals. The household social behaviors of dogs, cats and other domesticated
mammals provide additional valid, if informal, evidence of subjective awareness in these species.
diagram of the mammalian brain shows the general location and connections of the
representation of thalamus in mammalian vertebrates
The structure and location of the thalamus
is notably uniform across mammalian species, as can be seen in
the figures below:
would appear to satisfy the subjectivity criterion.
: As with mammals generally. Additionally, all great apes
exhibit robust subjective awareness of others of their species. Great apes have
demonstrated this advanced degree of awareness
through social MIS behavior, and through displays recorded in the wild. Recognition of
individuals is commonplace. Authors of a recent
(1997) study state this conclusion unequivocally: "The evidence that
individual primates recognize one another is overwhelming."
Beyond social behavior,
a few of the great apes have also demonstrated
subjective awareness of self
The "mark test" is the most famous example of this self-directed behavior.
In this test, researchers would anesthetize the ape and paint a red mark on its
eyebrow (outside the ape's range of direct visual perception).
Upon awaking, the ape would see the mark in a mirror and proceed to reach up and remove it.
[To date, only a few orangutans, chimpanzees and bonobos (and a lone gorilla) have passed this
test of self-recognition.]
The great apes exhibit a wide range of
social behaviors. Also, the ape thalamus is very close to the human in form and function.
We can conclude
that all of the great apes satisfy the subjectivity criterion.
humans satisfy the subjectivity criterion. (Self
-awareness is not, however,
present at birth. Among human infants recognition
of self in a mirror first occurs between 18 and 24 months.)
Table 17.4 appends the results for the
criteria, ordered by entity class
A few notes on the emergence of advanced
subjectivity may be appropriate at this point.
speaking, central nervous system development increases
awareness. A textbook on vertebrate evolution gives a succinct account of
The evolution of the vertebrate skeleton
cannot be divorced from that of the central nervous system; with increased
powers of locomotion there follows improved muscular coordination and, its
corollary, a greater awareness of the environment. This can be clearly
seen in the evolution of the gross morphology of the brain....
The thalamic attentional system would seem
to have evolved in such a way as to support more advanced forms of
awareness. A vertebrate anatomy text points out the fact that simple
locomotion does not require thalamic attention: only complex behaviors
with need for focused attention rely upon the thalamocortical system:
[I]n most mammals locomotion still occurs
in the absence of the thalamus and isocortex. Functions that are
impaired relate to complex behavioral sequences such as food seeking,
predator avoidance, establishment and defense of territories, and
reproduction, for example.
We might conjecture to say that when a
creature's complex behavior modifies its own environment in important ways, its
awareness of environment must take its own behavior into account. From a
physiologic perspective, this condition would require that the thalamic system
direct attentional resources back to the self.
and John Cant
argued that the large arboreal apes acquired a self concept through such a
mechanism. They hypothesize that the great weight of these apes makes
clambering in trees especially dangerous, and requires that the apes pay close
attention to the effect which their locomotion has on fragile arboreal
surroundings. Such a sustained attention would amount to a persistent
"online" self-monitoring strategy. And it is this strategy
which Povinelli and Cant propose led to the emergence of self-concept. This hypothesis
is consistent with experimental evidence that among apes, only the great apes
(those large apes descended from the trees) exhibit self-awareness.
has extended Povinelli and Cant's hypothesis.
He proposes that self-awareness, once engaged, has persisted in those great apes on whom it conferred a reproductive
advantage. This hypothesis,
too, has some evidence in its favor; for self-awareness is most acute among
great apes and humans near the onset of puberty.
But returning to the question which has
driven this review, namely: "Do any non-human
creatures also satisfy the requirements of personal identity?"
We have seen in
Table 17.4 that many creatures do appear to meet all three of these
"Great Criteria." These creatures share an anatomic
commonality, which is just the central nervous system (CNS). (It should be
noted again that this commonality appears to extend to the invertebrate octopus, as well
as to all vertebrate species.)
we've seen that creatures lacking a CNS exhibit only those behaviors allowed by
reflexive instinct and conditioned memory. Consequently those creatures
all fail to satisfy at least one of the necessary criteria.
highlights this distinction. A green row indicates an entity class whose
members invariably satisfy all three criteria. A yellow row indicates an
entity class wherein only some members satisfy all three criteria. And a
red row indicates an entity class whose members invariably fail to satisfy at
least one of the three criteria.
CNS creatures satisfy
all three criteria of personal identity.
The metaphysical significance of this
table is clear. The CNS serves as a rough divide between
those entities which appear to participate in Metaphysics by Default, and those
entities which appear not to participate. The divide does exist; and the CNS is an imperfect,
but increasingly factual, demarcation of that divide.
CNS transmigration is a defensible conclusion, but in some ways even more dour than the mortality
conclusion of Chapter 7. Certainly, it is not what we'd prefer.
But the conclusion does have some desirable qualities. These qualities will be examined in
the final chapters. I think most readers will find that the final chapters lift us from the essay's
current, bestial nadir.
To begin this recovery, I should emphasize that
the conjectured entry of CNS creatures into human
metaphysics cannot debase human beings. The soul is
not base, but is divinely inspired. We know this from experience.
Now, the question as to whether it be mortal or immortal this is only of
secondary concern. It follows that metaphysical theories are not capable of debasing
the soul. To the contrary, the soul's ability to fashion a panoply of
metaphysical ideas is testament to its essential divinity.
These facts of human nature are uncontroversial in
my own mind. I only state them here out of concern for readers who may feel
that theories of CNS transmigration somehow cheapen human
life. Such debasement can never occur so long as we are mindful of what is
divine in the human, and metaphysical philosophy does always remind us of
these things. Also, we should remember that Hindu, Buddhist and Neoplatonic philosophers have hypothesized
CNS transmigration for thousands of years, to no ill effect. History shows CNS transmigration philosophy to be fully consonant with human dignity.
Even so, it is
possible that a few confused readers might for a time pursue debasement, and
attempt to use Metaphysics by Default as a tool for attaining base
desires. We have experience with such persons. In the previous
century self-styled "Social Darwinists" misused Darwin's
theory of evolution by natural selection, twisting it into a rationale for brutality.
Social Darwinists embraced
evolution, but only as an excuse for their sins. A century on, we judge the
Social Darwinists as misguided, and false. The same epithets await those
who would misuse Metaphysics by Default for similar ends.
The philosophy's true social application
will be presented in the following chapter. To close out this current
chapter, we should reflect upon the words of a philosopher who will figure
prominently in the arguments ahead. He wakes us again to a promethean fact —
emergences are real
There is night and there is day, and to
point out that there is twilight does not deny either. It is not
arbitrary to regard one thing as living (a planarian) and another as
nonliving (a quartz crystal) just because some things are intermediate (a
crystallized virus). Wolves are sentient and trees nonsentient,
although ants live in a twilight zone. There are gradients of passage,
but emergences are real.
In our mind's eye we have now walked onto the
fifth and last of the five stepping stones. This last stone is just
the understanding that other CNS species can participate with Homo sapiens in the
existential passages of Metaphysics by Default. Standing on this last
stone, we are in position to take a final step out into the living world
that waits beyond the river Lethe.
next Chapter 18: Potential Benefits
Chapter 17, Section 4 Endnotes
George McKee has noted this limitation of bacterial chemotaxis (movement
along a chemical gradient) in a 1997 study of functional awareness, entitled "The Engine of Awareness: Autonomous Synchronous
Representations." His paper is available online
. Quoting from section 4.1.2:
"[B]acteria are sensitive to the distribution of nutrients in their environment and
modify their swimming in a way that leads them in the direction of greater
nutrient concentrations. Without understanding the way this modification of
behavior occurs, it is characteristic of people to attribute awareness and
motivation to each bacterium, saying that it "wants to go" up the nutrient
concentration gradient. After decades of study, however, bacterial chemotaxis is
now understood at the molecular level.... The models that have been developed are sufficiently detailed that they can be
analyzed exhaustively.... Although such an [exhaustive computational] analysis
has not been attempted, it appears
likely that... bacteria are not aware of their environment."
We could note, for example, the
cooperative behavior exhibited by honeybees during the repair of broken hive combs. The
behavior appears to be programmatic, rather than intentional; yet the honeybees demonstrate a remarkable flexibility under
experimental conditions which have been designed to foil rigid rule-driven behavior. See Remy Chauvin
and Bernadette Muckensturm-Chauvin,
, trans. Joyce Diamanti (New York:
International Universities Press, Inc., 1980) 153-65. It would
be interesting to subject robots to comparable experimental conditions, as a direct comparison
of abilities. A robot which exhibits behaviors near the current limit of
robotic neural net flexibility is described in Tani 149-76.
References to ninety years of neuron modelling can be found in
Maas, "Networks of Spiking Neurons: The Third Generation of Neural Network
Models." Neural Networks
10:9 (1997): 1661.
For results of a recent Delft University of Technology
simulation of raindrop formation,
For an example of a hurricane simulation, see Yubao Liu's "A Multiscale Numerical Study of
Hurricane Andrew (1992). Part I: Explicit Simulation and Verification,"
Robin F. A. Moritz and Christian Brandes, "Behavior Genetics
of Honeybees (Apis mellifera L.)," Neurobiology and
Behavior of Honeybees
21-35. Behavioral differences in arthropods can be
modified readily through selective breeding, as in Felicity Huntingford, The Study of Animal
(London and New York: Chapman and Hall, 1984) 306-16.
It should also be noted that explicit chemical cues trigger many arthropod
characterized popularly as "social." See, for example, Maier and Maier 230-33.
Menzel and Bicker 456.
The fiddler crab is an arthropod which might provide an exception
to this rule. Fiddler crabs establish social hiercharies through ritualized competition, as described in Maier and Maier 220-21.
The male fiddler crab appears to recognize other male competitors visually, as indicated by MIS
experiment. See Maier and Maier 234.
In addition, some social insects have been known to exhibit goal-oriented
behaviors which far exceed the cognitive abilities of solitary insects. Honeybees, for
been observed to innovate hive construction methods; to modify dance language within social context; and
to plan hive migration routes via group consensus. See James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould,
The Animal Mind
(New York: Scientific American Library, 1994) 88-113. See also note 41, above,
concerning the flexibility of comb repair behaviors.
Each of these honeybee behaviors, if considered in
isolation, might be explicable in terms of conditioned instinct. But as a whole, such
innovative and cooperative stratagems suggest that honeybees have more going on upstairs than can readily be tested.
If honeybees lack the neural mass requisite of true self-concept, as seems likely, perhaps they possess enough grey matter
to maintain a general "forage-space-time concept," subservient to a selfless "hive-state
concept." Conceivably, the latter concept could act as a master regulator, driving hive maintenance
behaviors through variable action parameters; so that behaviors oriented always towards the ideal hive state. Such a scheme would make coordinated group behavior possible, without incurring the cost of self-conception.
But here this author is merely speculating, with no clear idea as to how
such group behavior really could be implemented in an utterly self-less manner.
Do social insects have a self concept? Do they maintain subjective awareness of others?
Reflexive, regimented behaviors and millimeter-diameter brains suggest that they do not. But goal-oriented, social behaviors suggest something more.
So this author is unsure, and would welcome edifying thoughts on the subject.
Bullock and Horridge 1: 312.
Bullock and Horridge 2: 1119-20.
It should be noted that this experiment has not yet been
Hanlon and Messenger 140.
Hanlon and Messenger 181-82.
Hanlon and Messenger 187. An entertaining
account of octopus foraging among laboratory tanks can be found in Ronald Rood, Animals Nobody
(Brattleboro, Vermont: The Stephen Greene Press, 1971) 79-81.
For a study of stickleback MIS behavior,
see Chauvin and Chauvin 129-32. For an MIS study of stickleback
cooperation in predator inspection, see Lee Alan Dugatkin, Cooperation Among Animals: An Evolutionary
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 59-70. See especially
section 3.9.3, "Do inspectors use the Tit for Tat Strategy?"
For a review of MIS among several vertebrate species, see Gordon
G. Gallup, Jr., "Towards an Operational Definition of Self-Awareness," Socioecology and Psychology of Primates
, Ed. Russell
H. Tutle (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975) 309-421.
This author is not aware of any MIS studies which have been
conducted on octopus species. References to any such studies would fill a lacuna
in this section of the essay, and would be welcome.
For entertaining descriptions of fish social
behaviors, see Konrad Z. Lorenz, King Solomon's
Ring: New Light on Animal Ways
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952) 22-38;
and Chauvin and Chauvin 123-40, especially 132-33. For cooperative social behavior among fish species,
see Dugatkin 45-70. For cooperative social behavior among birds, see Dugatkin 71-89.
For social behaviors of domestic birds, see E. S. E. Hafez, ed., The Behaviour of Domestic
edition (Baltimore: The Williams &
Wilkins Company, 1969). See especially the several sections devoted to social relationships
in Part Four, "Behaviour of Birds."
Stickleback and parrot indivualizations
are noted in Chauvin and Chauvin 21-24. A relevant stickleback observation is recorded in
Sarnat and Netsky 408.
Sarnat and Netsky 408.
See especially Gallup 310-12.
See, for example, Trevor B. Poole,
Social Behaviour in Mammals.
(Glasgow and London:
Blackie, 1985) 156-96; Chapter 6, "An Order-By-Order Synopsis of Social Behaviour."
For recent field studies of dolphins, see Richard C. Connor, Rachel A. Smolker, and Andrew F. Richards,
"Dolphin Alliances and Coalitions," Coalitions
and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals
, eds. Alexander H. Harcourt and
Frans B. M. De Waal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 415-43.
See, for example, Hafez, The Behaviour of Domestic
. See especially the several sections devoted to social relationships
in Part Three, "Behaviour of Mammals."
See, for example, Chauvin and Chauvin 21-22.
Sarnat and Netsky 409.
Sarnat and Netsky 409.
Michael Tomasello, and Josep Call,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 193. For
supporting evidence of primate social awareness, see especially Chapters
An early study (1975) is found in Gallup 321-30. A more
recent survey (1997) of great ape MIS studies is found in Karyl B. Swartz,
"What Is Mirror Self-Recognition in Nonhuman Primates, and What Is It
Not?" The Self Across Psychology: Self-recognition,
Self-awareness, and the Self Concept
, eds. Joan Gay Snodgrass and Robert L.
Thompson (New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1997) 65-71. Another
recent review of great ape MIS studies can be found in Tomasello and Call
It should be noted that bottlenose dolphins may have passed a modified version of
the test. See Kenneth Marten and Suchi Psarakos,
"Evidence of self-awareness in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus
)," Self-awareness in animals and humans
, eds. Sue Taylor Parker, Robert W. Mitchell and Maria L. Boccia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 361-79.
J. R. Anderson, "The Development of Self-recognition: A
Review," Developmental Psychobiology
(1984): 35-49. See also Robert W. Mitchell, "The Evolution of Primate
Cognition: Simulation, Self-Knowledge, and Knowledge of Other Minds," Hominid Culture in Primate Perspective
, eds. Duane
Quiatt and Junichiro Itani (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1994) 216.
Sarnat and Netsky 409.
L. B. Halstead, The Pattern of Vertebrate
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1969) 57. See also: Encyclopaedia Britannica article on vertebrate encephalization
Swartz 65-71. See also Mitchell 177-232.
Gallup, "On the Rise and Fall of Self-Conception in
Primates," The Self Across Psychology:
Self-recognition, Self-awareness, and the Self Concept
76-80. Other social factors may have contributed to
the emergence of a self concept. The cognitive demands of apprenticeship and Machievellian scenarios have
been examined in this light. See Sue Taylor Parker and Robert W. Mitchell, "Evolving self-awareness," Self-awareness in animals and humans
, eds. Sue Taylor Parker, Robert W. Mitchell and Maria L. Boccia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 424-25.
For a well-written introduction to contemporary studies of animal cognition,
see James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind
. Here also is a listing of some relevant online references:
- A bibliography of animal cognition, organized by David
- A bibliography of animal cognition, after Griffin,
Allen & Bekoff.
- Animal neuroanatomy atlases, organized by Neil A. Busis, M.D.
- Monkey image dataset with 3-D brain system
models, Laboratory of Neuro Imaging (LONI), UCLA.
- Atlas of the primate brain, Regional Primate Research Center (RPSC), University of Washington.
- Cross-sections of monkey brain, University of Oregon Biology Department.
Holmes Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics:
Duties to and Values in the Natural World
(Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1988) 70.