Chapter 17. Application to Other Species. Section 1 of 4

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1	A Word of Encouragement
2	Dar al-Hikma
3	Proclus' Elements
4	Reversion in the Corporeal
5	Mathematical Recursion
6	Episodic Memory
7	Mortality
7s	Classical Mortality Arguments
8	Personal Identity 1 2 3 4
9	Existential Passage 1 2 3
10	Precedent at Dar al-Hikma
10s	Images of Dar al-Hikma
11	Passage Types
12	A Metaphysical Grammar
13	Merger Probability
14	Ex Nihilo Probability
15	Noetic Reduction
16	Summary of Mathematical Results
17	Application to Other Species 1 2 3 4
18	Potential Benefits
19	A Dedication
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Chapter 17
Application to Other Species

In Chapter 8 we verified that three specific criteria are necessary (and are likely sufficient) for the maintenance of personal identity. Again, they are: continuity, subjectivity and memory.

It is self-evident that the human mind possesses capabilities far in excess of those required for the bare maintenance of personal identity. The three criteria operate at a level of consciousness which is lower than that of language, empathy, skill, foresight, and other advanced mental states. To the extent that a person develops these higher capabilities, that person gains distinction, and character. Or looking at it from the opposite pole: to the extent that a person neglects these capabilities, he or she falls short of the Ideal Character.

Of course, character development, as a body of thought, is well understood. We needn't review it here. The minimal, criterial requirements of personal identity do not approach character, or even intelligence. Identity criteria are really quite base in comparison with our higher qualities. And this raises a question:

Do any non-human creatures also satisfy the requirements of personal identity?

The baseness of the criteria imparts gravity to this question, for "when standards are low, many pass." Any non-human creatures that do satisfy the requirements should, we might think, be co-participants in existential passage. They would be commingled with us in passage — ontologically indistinguishable from humans.

Here I should be clear: by speaking of such creatures as "ontologically indistinguishable from humans," I mean to say that they would participate in passage as subjective unities, just as humans may be thought to participate. According to prior tenets of Metaphysics by Default, the minimum number of participants who can transfer through an existential passage should be one: no "fractional" participation seems possible. And so any participant should count as one participant, regardless of character, intelligence or evolutionary lineage.

Mental differences among creatures do exist of course. Creatures exhibit these differences in an amazing variety of behaviors. But the criteria of personal identity would seem to isolate those particular mental differences (or perhaps, ontologic differences) of metaphysical import.

So, do any non-human creatures satisfy the requirements of personal identity? The answer is not obvious, and we are easily misled by emotional guides. On the one hand, our imaginative empathy towards other creatures tempts us to see in animals the psychological qualities we appreciate in humans. On the other hand, our need to control the natural world tempts us to strip creatures of their innate psychological lives, so as to deal with them as mere "resources," or "automata."

I am subject to these distortions myself. My imaginative empathy wants all furry animals to be sentient and emotive — even furry caterpillars. This, while my need for control wills me to see chickens and cows as mere foodstuffs. The conflict inherent in these two views surfaces almost immediately. One can say, "But cows are furry animals," and set my mind at odds against itself.

We can resolve this sort of conflict (and reach an answer to the stated question) if we restrict our view to the three criteria of personal identity. This is the regimen we will follow in this chapter. We'll check each class of ontologic entity for each criterion of personal identity. When we've worked through all classes and all criteria, we will have filled in a table of results. Hopefully this table will help us answer the question with some useful accuracy.

First we should review the criteria, stating them as they will be understood throughout this chapter:

Continuity: "Continuity" will stand for "physical continuity." This is the continuance of physical structures in a body over time. Individual atoms may be replaced, but the replacement atoms must be of the same elements as the atoms lost, so that the structures retain their functional characteristics over time.
Memory: "Memory" will stand for "episodic memory." This is the ability to "reach back" into the past. More specifically, it is the ability to retrieve egocentric episodes as a temporal chain of life events.
Subjectivity: "Subjectivity" will stand for the "subjective locus," or "the ability to distinguish self from not-self." If the definition is to be substantial, it should exclude purely reflexive physiologies and behaviors. Reflexes do not separate, or abstract, conscious experience from primitive sensation. Bare reflexes are almost certainly inadequate for subjective awareness.

We start off with the empty table below:

Table 17.1
Personal identity criteria, ordered by entity class

Continuity

Memory

Subjectivity

Humans

Great apes

Mammals

Vertebrates

Invertebrates

Computers

Multi-celled plants

Eukaryotes/prokaryotes

Inanimates

Each criterion of personal identity heads its respective column. On the left, each row is assigned a different entity "class." These classes have not been derived according to any strict scheme, and they do not cover every possible type of existent: they are only convenient and useful categories. For the limited purpose of estimating the reach of personal identity, they will do.

The classes of entities are arranged bottom-up, in rough order of increasing complexity. This arrangement is something of a taxonomic tradition, so we keep it here. We will fill the table from the bottom, as this ordering conforms with notions of "evolutionary development." This ordering also makes for an easier exposition.

The five possible values of each table entry will be: none, few, some, most, and all.

We'll begin the classification by looking first at the continuity criterion.

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